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Introduction: A Critique of Human Exceptionalism 
 
“She looked over his shoulder / For vines and olive trees, / Marble well-governed 
cities / And ships upon untamed seas, / But there on the shining metal / His 
hands had put instead / An artificial wilderness / And a sky like lead.”  
–W. H. Auden, The Shield of Achilles 
 
 
A distinguishing aspect of Virginia Woolf’s oeuvre is her view of life experience 
as deeply interconnected and collectively shared. In A Sketch of the Past, she shares an 
epiphanic moment from her youth when she “was looking at the flower bed” and realized 
“that is the whole’… that was the real flower; part earth; part flower” (Sketch 71). This 
instant, in which she ties the physical flower to its temporal and physical germination in 
the earth from which its life sprouted, is emblematic of her entire worldview. For Woolf, 
all life is intrinsically sustained on its coexistence with the natural world. Dwelling on 
this realization, she adds, “it was a thought I put away as being likely to be very useful to 
me later,” and indeed, as this thesis will show, it is one that she develops in her novels To 
the Lighthouse and Between the Acts (Sketch 71).  
Woolf makes it her mission as a writer to expose interconnectedness, and she 
develops a stream-of-consciousness technique that often lacks a distinction between 
narrator and character. The technique makes little contrast between the nonmaterial mind 
and the bodily realm of character. This thesis will argue that this tendency towards 
interconnectedness through lack of division continues even further, working to break 
down the boundaries that divide and separate humans from animals, organisms from 
machines, and the physical from the nonmaterial. The interconnectedness informs an 
entire field of ecofeminist conceptions, as laid out by Donna Haraway’s Cyborg 





where the clean lines between traditional and modern, organic and technological, human 
and nonhuman give way to the infoldings of the flesh that powerful figures such as the 
cyborgs and dogs I know both signify and enact” (Species 7). Like the worldview 
expressed by Woolf, these “powerful figures” exemplify an interconnectedness in which 
there are no distinctive boundaries between traditional dualisms. 
Read through an ecofeminist lens, the interconnectedness presented by Woolf 
seeks to overcome a set of dualisms on which patriarchal structures insist. Ecocritic Greg 
Garrard writes that ecologists mark “the anthropocentric dualism humanity/nature as the 
ultimate source of anti-ecological beliefs and practices, but ecofeminism also blames the 
androcentric dualism man/woman” for the more deep-seated issue that accounts for those 
same practices and beliefs (26). Similarly, Woolf sources the issue as a form of 
patriarchal egoism that casts woman/nature as an other to man/culture. Although Woolf, 
historically, would not have had access to the ecocritical discourse that addresses the 
contemporary proliferation of technology, Woolf’s purposeful omission of divisions that 
traditionally partition and disconnect one life from another demonstrates an attempt to 
imagine what it means to live without them. 
Both To the Lighthouse and Between the Acts break down the sharp divisions 
found in patriarchal dualisms. However, the way in which Woolf engages with 
patriarchal egoism as the source of anti-feminist and anti-ecological dualisms differs in 
each novel. In To the Lighthouse, she implements a form of consciousness that is 
associatively cyborgian, according to Haraway’s understanding. For Woolf, the cyborg 
operates as a consciousness, or a distinct mode of awareness, perception, and 
imagination. It is principally observed in the middle section, “Time Passes,” as a 





human and animal, organism and machine, and the physical and the nonphysical. In 
Between the Acts, Woolf reformulates the idea concerning these boundaries to 
specifically dissolve the division between nature and culture. Just as Haraway repurposes 
her conception of the cyborg to address the interactions between human and nonhuman 
entities in her theory of natureculture, Woolf makes a similar move in redirecting her 
focus from radical non-anthropocentrism in “Time Passes” to a more inclusionary view 
of humanity in Between the Acts. 
Haraway, in her 2008 work When Species Meet, explains how patriarchal 
egoism’s insistence on anthropocentrism results in a delusionary worldview. 
Anthropocentrism entails the self-privileging focus of humanity as the center of the 
universe. Made a “fantasy” through four “wounds” that have temporally, spatially, and 
teleologically decentered humanity, this human exceptionalism is posed as a 
psychological mechanism in which “the primary narcissism of the self-centered human 
subject… tries to hold panic at bay” (Species 10). The first wound is the spatial and 
temporal decentering of the “Copernican wound that removed Earth itself, man’s home 
world, from the center of the cosmos and indeed paved the way for that cosmos to burst 
open into a universe of inhumane, nonteleological times and spaces” (Species 10). The 
second is the Darwinian one which placed “Homo sapiens firmly in the world of other 
critters.” Thirdly, the Freudian emphasis on the subconscious removed man’s “unique 
excellence, with dire consequences for teleology once again” (Species 11). Haraway then 
adds a fourth: “the informatic or cyborgian, which infolds organic and technological 
flesh” (Species 11). Given that the cyborg’s blending of non-material and social realities 
brings about historical transformations, all four of these “wounds” remove humanity’s 





The conclusion, then, is an understanding in which all of humanity is situated as a result 
of dynamic nonhuman forces and is “a spatial and temporal web of interspecies 
dependencies” (Species 10). This inclusionary view of nonhuman forces and agents calls 
for the human relationship with the past to be understood as one in which humanity is not 
the sole author and concentration of written and non-written histories. Humans’ 
relationship with the past and their own temporality must also be understood in terms of 
the technological, animal, and nonmaterial entities that have shaped their history. 
Haraway coins the term “natureculture” to encapsulate this idea.  
Although Haraway withholds a definition of natureculture, in which human 
exceptionalism is disparaged, Greg Gerrard defines natureculture according to Haraway’s 
understanding as a “theoretical construct of cultural theory that attempts to circumvent 
the conventional duality of the two terms that make it up. Natureculture suggests the 
continual interpenetration and mutual constitution of the human and non-human worlds” 
(208). This neologism accounts for the decentering of human privilege and for the 
reactions against the dualisms that patriarchal structures presuppose. In Woolf’s work, 
illustrations of a natureculture can be found in moments where there is 
interconnectedness and shared experience among the human, animal, technological, and 
nonphysical realms. As in Woolf’s rumination on the flower, in which she conceives it as 
an unbounded and mixed entity, Haraway’s figures of the cyborg and the dog 
demonstrate natureculture through their unbounded formation.  
In A Cyborg Manifesto, Haraway describes the figure of the cyborg as a socially 
constructed hybrid of the organic and the machinic that exists in both cultural and 
fictional spheres. The social reality that the cyborg occupies is a “political construction” 





“oppression” as an other, as a “crucial” and “collective” point of orientation (Manifesto 
5-6). These shared experiences act as a source for an imaginative consciousness, and one 
on which “liberation rests” (Manifesto 6). Liberation, then, is not limited to the 
construction of social reality, but also relies on the “construction of consciousness… and 
so of possibility” (Manifesto 6). The cyborg blends these two spheres together into a 
“condensed image of both imagination and material reality” (Manifesto 7). The lack of 
division between these two realms enables the fused consciousness of the cyborg to 
include a wide range of perspectives and subjectivities that are not wholly dependent on a 
single realm as a source for shared collectivity. In To the Lighthouse, the consciousness is 
likewise not reliant on a singular source for perception and operates through a mixing of 
the physical and imaginative spheres.  
The importance of this mixture cannot be overstated, as it specifically removes 
the reliance on the “traditions of ‘Western’ science and politics” as a source of 
perspective, worldview, and comprehension” (Manifesto 7). Haraway defines these 
“Western” mores as “the tradition of racist, male-dominant capitalism… of progress… of 
the appropriation of nature as resource for the productions of culture… of reproduction of 
the self from the reflections of the other” (Manifesto 7). Therefore, the liberating 
possibilities allowed by the cyborg are those that do not privilege the traditional 
understandings, and instead promote new perspectives and subjectivities.  
Haraway reads the cyborg as independent of a Western myth of domination. 
Instead, it opts for interdependence and liberation without a struggle, as it does not 
“identif[y] with nature in the Western sense” (Manifesto 8). The cyborg also does not 
strive for wholeness or completeness, as it denies the “endless splitting and searches for a 





cyborg denounces the belief that an object’s determining characteristics are intrinsic to it, 
its goal instead is one of consciousness, in which the parts that constitute it are not denied 
those characteristics that set them apart. Such a consciousness takes shape through 
“mark[ing] out a self-consciously constructed space that cannot affirm the capacity to act 
on the basis of natural identification, but only on the basis of conscious coalition, of 
affinity” (Manifesto 16). This consciousness allows the acknowledgment of multiplicities 
and a “sea of differences” (Manifesto 16). The cyborg, then, is a hybrid that vilifies the 
“plot of original unity out of which difference must be produced and enlisted in a drama 
of escalating domination of woman/nature” (Manifesto 8). Independence from a 
mandated and dominated schema accounts for the cyborg’s ability to encompass in itself 
a constructed consciousness in which a myriad of variations are bound. 
Furthermore, the figure of the cyborg breaks down the traditionally strict 
boundaries that domination presupposes – namely the borders between human and 
animals, organisms and machines, and physical and nonphysical spheres. The breakdown 
of these three traditional boundaries set forward by Western patriarchal systems 
necessitate in turn the collapse of the sharp divisions between self and other, the mind 
and body, and the public and private. The figure of the cyborg, encompassing 
multiplicities and a “sea of differences,” becomes a radical reorientation of perception 
expressing combined intuitions and subjectivities (Manifesto 16). Haraway writes that 
“the political struggle is to see from both perspectives at once because each reveals both 
dominations and possibilities unimaginable from the other vantage point” (Manifesto 15). 
This binding of multiple perspectives and subjectivities constitutes and affects cyborgian 
consciousness. Such intersubjectivity in particular allows for the cyborg to be a hybrid 





transcend the dichotomies through the inclusion of non-human, non-organic, and non-
physical subjectivities. Haraway writes that “the cyborg appears in myth precisely where 
the boundary between human and animal is transgressed,” and so too at the boundaries 
between “animal-human (organism) and machine,” and “between physical and 
nonphysical” entities (Manifesto 11;12). As a result, these three, long-established, and 
strict borders are presented as fluid, permeable, and lacking division.  
The figure of the cyborg disparages the lack of complex subjectivity found in “the 
old dominations of white capitalist patriarchy” and Woolf’s To the Lighthouse likewise 
takes a critical stance against them (Manifesto 69). To oppose the egoism presented in the 
dominating patriarchal forces at play in To the Lighthouse, a consciousness that is 
associatively cyborgian, or a reconstructed imagination offered by a cyborgian figure, is 
implemented. This consciousness is particularly found in the middle section, “Time 
Passes,” in which multiple perspectives and subjectivities are presented. The sources, 
which include the ruminations of the impersonal narrator of “Time Passes,” Lily 
Briscoe’s painting, James, and the memory of Mrs. Ramsay, present themselves as partial 
agents of the cyborgian consciousness as a mode of awareness, perception, and 
imagination. For example, in a statement that directly opposes patriarchal egoism and 
acknowledges multiple subjectivities and perspectives, James states in sailing to the 
lighthouse, “nothing was simply one thing” (Lighthouse 186). Mirroring the narrator’s 
and other characters’ heightened awareness, James’ acknowledgment of multiplicities 
and perspectives aside from his own shows his attempt to view the world differently from 
the traditional, patriarchal perspective of his father, Mr. Ramsay. 
In the middle section of the novel’s three parts, the uncultivated world, that which 





foreground. Simultaneously, the strictly human world that sustains the 
compartmentalized dualisms, or that which deals entirely with culture, is given a smaller, 
secondary focus in correspondingly sharp and angular brackets. This section privileges 
non-androcentric and non-anthropocentric perspectives, even during times of war – an 
activity traditionally conceived as uniquely human and uniquely male. By removing 
human understanding from the central focus, the narrator offers a plentitude of 
perspectives and subjectivities that corrode patriarchal egoism’s rigid boundaries. In 
“Time Passes,” the cyborgian consciousness functions to show the full 
interconnectedness of life in terms of cosmic time. 
The figure of the cyborg presents a worldview in which there are no exclusive 
contrasts between each group that composes a patriarchal dualism. Rooted in the effects 
brought about by the cyborg, natureculture provides an understanding that causes “the 
Great Divides of animal/ human, nature/ culture, organic/ technical, and wild/domestic 
[to] flatten into mundane differences” (Species 15). However, “Time Passes” collapses 
“the Great Divides” of human exceptionalism in a way that marginalizes the human 
characters altogether. By decentering humanity, the section trivializes any human 
teleology in which the end goal bestows human action with purpose and meaning. 
Instead, the section imbues human life with meaning through shared spatial and temporal 
histories with other nonhuman entities. Between the Acts, although more inclusionary of 
humanity, condemns human exceptionalism by positioning human life and culture as an 
experience that is fundamentally shaped by nonhuman life forms, such as those presented 
in “Time Passes”; the types of nonhuman life forms found in To the Lighthouse, 
perceived only on account of the middle section’s radical non-anthropocentrism, are 





culture. In order to disparage human exceptionalism, the proliferation of the kinds of life 
forms found in the community’s past and present contextualizes human life within shared 
existence.  
In Between the Acts, Bartholomew’s Afghan hound is one such life form that 
augments human life with meaning. As an emblematic figure of natureculture, dogs are a 
companion species that shows the patriarchal dualisms to be permeable and broken down. 
Haraway, in reference to her relationship with her dog, explains that “species 
interdependence is the name of the worlding game on earth… I am who I become with 
companion species, who and which make a mess out of categories in the making of kin 
and kind” (Species 19). Haraway sees the categories that typify the separation of one 
form of life from another as insufficient means of defining “kin and kind.” Instead, 
mutually dependent interactions with other life forms give human existence its shape. 
Humans and dogs, to name just one example of this kind of interspecies relationship, are 
equal partners in terms of how they both understand themselves through their 
companionship. Moreover, both partners rely on the other for their very identity, as 
Haraway writes: “the partners do not precede the meeting; species of all kinds, living and 
not, are consequent on a subject- and object-shaping dance of encounters” (Species 4). It 
is humanity’s relationships with other species that give human life its physical and 
psychological definition. Dogs in a natureculture show how patriarchal dualisms are 
obsolete and redundant through the concept of “infolding” (Species 249). Haraway writes 
that “the infolding of others to one another is what makes up the knots we call 
beings…material, specific, non-self-identical, and semiotically active” (Species 249; 
emphasis in original). Furthermore, like Woolf’s realization of the flower, this continuous 





dependence. Haraway uses the term “infolding” to address the constant interplay of 
likenesses and differences: “I like the word infolding better than interface to suggest the 
dance of world-making encounters” (Species 249). For Haraway, infolding is a 
continuous exchange of selfhood in which humans and nonhumans are reshaped and 
redefined in terms of each other. 
However, dogs are just one example of the critters that compose a natureculture. 
Since a natureculture is composed of the “flesh” of “machinic, human, and animal beings 
[with] historically situated infoldings,” human beings must be defined in a way that 
accounts for the proliferation of material substances that can embody a natureculture 
(Species 216). Haraway, like Miss La Trobe, who is the artist and playwright responsible 
for the central pageant play in Between the Acts, writes that she is “a creature of the mud” 
(Species 1). In contrast to the patriarchal dualisms’ urge to compartmentalize life forms, 
mud in the novel suggests a mixture between human, animal, and even technological 
matter through its agricultural implications. Mud is a nondescript and amorphous 
conglomeration that provides nature, culture, and La Trobe’s subconscious with the 
inspiration needed for expression, as suggested through the passage, “the mud became 
fertile. Words rose above… wonderful words” (Acts 125). Significantly, in recognition of 
mud’s intrinsically diverse nature, human life-experience is reformulated accordingly as a 
shared existence with nonhuman entities. Haraway explains further that “90 percent of 
the cells [in her body] are filled with the genomes of bacteria, fungi, protists, and such, 
some of which play in a symphony necessary to my being alive at all” (Species 1). The 
quote describes how the human body houses and shares genetic make-up with a 
plentitude of nonhuman entities in such a way that both Haraway’s life and the lives of 





sustainment. Haraway prefers the term “zoon” or “critter” to describe the mixed entities 
that constitute a natureculture, the human body being just one example. Zoons are “the 
machinic, human, and animal beings whose historically situated infoldings are the flesh 
of contemporary naturecultures” (Species 261). Like mud, “these agents can be human 
beings or parts of human beings, other organisms in part or whole, machines of many 
kinds, or other sorts of… things made to work in the technological compound of 
conjoined forces” (Species 249). Zoons are entities that bind together different forms of 
matter in a way that defies the traditional conception that an entity’s own life is contained 
wholly and solely within it. Haraway writes: 
Never purely themselves, things are compound; they are made up of combinations 
of other things coordinated to magnify power, to make something happen, to 
engage the world, to risk fleshly acts of interpretation. Technologies are 
compound. They are composed of diverse agents of interpretation… a compound 
animal in zoological terminology refers to a composite of individual organisms, 
an enclosure of zoons, a company of critters infolded into one… zoons are 
technologies, and technologies are zoons. (Species 249) 
Zoons affirm natureculture and “risk fleshly acts of interpretation” through their inherent 
and inclusive diversity. Like the figure of the cyborg, the parts that constitute zoons are 
not denied the characteristics that set them apart, and instead are “compound[ed]” and 
“infolded” into one. Zoons, along with the figure of the cyborg, combine the patriarchal 
dualisms into a mixed category, thereby nullifying the patriarchal need for an other. The 
removal of a need for an other constitutes an ecofeminist stance, as it is in modes of 
patriarchal egoism in which man exploits nonhuman entities and the landscape that 





traditionally conceived others as integral to the meaning of human life, thereby rendering 
anti-ecological beliefs and practices, such as anthropogenic climate change, as 
hypocritical and self-destructive. By rejecting patriarchal figures and the exploitative 
modes they uphold, conceptions such as the cyborg and natureculture liberate women and 
nature as expressive agents.  
Natureculture demands a reformulation of what it means to be human and, in 
Between the Acts, the human realm found in the pastoral community is reinterpreted in 
terms of the greater ecological implications which “powerful figures such as the cyborgs 
and dogs” introduce (Species 7). Like “Time Passes,” in which the narrator evokes an 
awareness of cosmic time, Between the Acts retains a similar awareness of a large 
temporal scope, but more explicitly situates the narrative in terms of geological and 
ecological time. This immense temporal range suggests that the humans who partake in 
communal life are deluded through their self-privileging in regards to a distanced and 
pejorative other. Although the human characters, aside from Mrs. Swithin and Miss La 
Trobe, are unaware of the need, Woolf normatively demands an attention to the 
reformulation of human life. This reformulation can be read in terms of Haraway’s 
understanding of natureculture. 
The following chapter of this thesis will analyze the cyborgian consciousness in 
To the Lighthouse as it presents an interconnectedness amongst the three dualisms that 
Haraway identifies – human and animal, organism and machine, and physical and 
nonphysical. The third chapter will examine Between the Acts as a portrayal of 
natureculture in which the three disparaged dualisms invite the collapse of the boundary 





disparaging anti-ecological dualisms, and suggest that the two novels serve as a 



























Chapter I: Consciousness and the Nonhuman in To the Lighthouse 
 
The figure of the cyborg disparages the lack of complex subjectivity found in “the 
old dominations of white capitalist patriarchy” and Woolf’s To the Lighthouse likewise 
takes a critical stance against it (Manifesto 69). The events of the novel are set against the 
background of patriarchal domination and particularly its egoism. For example, when 
Lily Briscoe is painting, “[Mr. Ramsay] seemed to be saying, look at me; and indeed, all 
the time he was feeling, Think of me, think of me” (Lighthouse 152). Male self-
centeredness is posed as the novel’s central antagonistic force against which the female 
characters must operate. In the novel, egoism is presented as highly antagonistic in at 
least two ways. Firstly, it imposes gender restrictions that limit the range of subjectivity 
and perspective in others. Charles Tansley demonstrates this when he whispers in Lily’s 
ear the significant refrain, ‘Women can’t paint, women can’t write…” (Lighthouse 48). 
This restricting sentiment is directly combatted through Lily’s successful artistic 
expression in her painting; the novel precisely champions the overcoming of this egoism 
for the sake of an alternative, female subjectivity and to facilitate, through Lily’s 
painting, a fulfilled lamentation. It is her voice that ends the novel, saying, “I have had 
my vision” (Lighthouse 209). Her “vision” is a painting heavily infused with the memory 
of Mrs. Ramsay. Secondly, this egoism expresses itself through linear, teleological 
thought and is strongly associated with Mr. Ramsay’s mind. His ruminations are rigid 
and teleological, or in search of a definite end; his journey of “thought is like the 
keyboard of a piano, divided into so many notes, or like the alphabet is ranged in twenty-
six letters all in order” (Lighthouse 33). His linear and sequential mode of thought is 





inability to change perspective or acknowledge other characters’ subjectivities 
(Lighthouse 32-33). It is this male egoism, which the novel often pits against the female 
other, that informs human exceptionalism. The result is an insistence on the sharp 
divisions and dominations not only between men and women in the novel, but also 
among other traditional dualisms: human and animal, organism and machine, and the 
physical and non-physical. 
  Indeed, egoism in the novel is presented as a direct cause of these rigid divisions. 
Consider, for example, the circus’ advertisement and Mrs. Ramsay’s ruminations 
preceding it. Walking in the town with Mr. Tansley, she bolsters his ego through her 
attention, which flatters him. She “insinuate[s] too as she did the greatness of man’s 
intellect, even in its decay, the subjection of all wives… to their husbands’ labors. She 
made him feel better pleased with himself than he had done yet” (Lighthouse 10-11). She 
turns her attention to a man placing an advertisement for a circus: “a hundred horsemen, 
twenty performing seals, lions, tigers” (Lighthouse 11).  She then claims that “it was 
terribly dangerous work for a one-armed man… to stand on top of a ladder like that–his 
left arm had been cut off in a reaping machine two years ago” (Lighthouse 11). In this 
passage, domestic tyranny, “the subjection of all wives to their husband’s labors,” is 
implicitly linked with the oppressive force that dominates wild animals and nature for the 
sake of capital gain and egoistical spectacle. Even machinery, illustrated here by “a 
reaping machine,” and the relationship between man and machine, is exhibited as a 
source of entertainment through the “one-armed man.” Haraway describes the organism-
machine relationship as a traditional “border war,” and it is likewise presented in the 
quote as a point of man’s domination (Manifesto 7). As the passage appears early on in 





wanting to be noticed, comes to Mrs. Ramsay in “The Window” and later to Lily Briscoe 
in “The Lighthouse” to be filled with “sympathy” (Lighthouse 37;151). Furthermore, 
male egoism avows itself to be distinct from the nonphysical. For example, in a moment 
of isolation, Mr. Ramsay is narrowminded and lacks perspective. As the narrator dwells 
on his loneliness, the text reads: “he kept even in that desolation a vigilance which spared 
no phantom and luxuriated in no vision” (Lighthouse 44). Despite the different 
perspective isolation may lend, Mr. Ramsay cannot “spare” a thought for and recognize 
the nonphysical or “phantom[s]” of the past due to his lack of “vision.” The egoism 
principally illustrated through the characters of Mr. Ramsay and Mr. Tansley insists on 
the rigid dualisms that Haraway’s figure of the cyborg seeks to overcome, and it is this 
egoism to which the cyborgian consciousness in the novel responds and which it 
counteracts.  
As stated above, the egoism in the novel insists on linearity – something distinctly 
disrupted by the “Time Passes” section. The distortion of linear time in this section is 
primarily achieved through the absence of a uniquely present moment. Although the total 
time passed amounts to ten years from when the human characters leave the house to 
their return, the middle section overlays the passage of human time with the narratorial 
portrayal of two days and nights. There is indeed a temporal correspondence between the 
aphoristic chapters and the brief parentheticals that end them, but this correspondence is 
unintelligible as a uniquely present moment by human understanding. By evading a strict 
sense of chronology, the impersonal narrator makes it impossible to piece together the 
events in a linear fashion. Paul Sheehan affirms this lack of linear thought in the “Time 
Passes” section, saying, “For although there are different temporal designs in play, these 





Despite the lack of chronology, the narrator presents the temporality in terms of the 
cosmos, as suggested by the quote, “flesh turned to atoms which drove before the wind, 
of stars flashing in their hearts” (Lighthouse 132). The immense scope of cosmic time, in 
conjunction with the absence of a present moment by human standards, creates a tone in 
which the cosmos is utterly indifferent to distinctly human affairs. This cosmic 
indifference, which intrinsically disparages the teleology assumed by human 
exceptionalism, allows the presented consciousness to explore multiple nonhuman 
perspectives and subjectivities. 
In the section’s reevaluation in terms of focus, the large scope of cosmic time 
presents both human and nonhuman life as coexistent and equally inconsequential. 
Aspects of both the human world and the natural world are trivial, yet interconnected 
through their subservience to time. For example, “Once in the middle of the night with a 
roar, with a rupture, as after centuries of quiescence, a rock rends itself from the 
mountain and hurtles crashing into the valley, one fold of the shawl loosened and swung 
to and fro” (Lighthouse 130). Via simile, the narrator applies grandiose and hyperbolic 
descriptors such as “roar” and “rupture” to the tearing of a shawl left hanging in the 
house. The effect, being one of exaggeration and overstatement, serves to highlight the 
momentousness of the “shawl loosen[ing] and [swinging] to and fro” while 
simultaneously drawing attention to the opposite: the degree to which the shawl’s tearing 
is quiet and unnoticed. This overemphasizing bestows upon both the human and natural 
worlds the same degree of insignificance in the face of cosmic time. Furthermore, as the 
simile shows, the interchangeable qualities of the human and natural realms suggest how 





animals and plants are a part, with the human realm constitutes the cyborg’s first of the 
three major breakdowns.  
Haraway’s figure of the cyborg also necessitates the collapse of the division 
between organic and technological realms. As a brief example, the narrator describes 
“weeds” as “tap[ing]” methodically at the window-pane” (Lighthouse 132). The 
cyborgian consciousness, embodied in the narrative voice, ascribes to the organic weeds a 
nonorganic attribute through its structured and timed pattern. However, the merger of the 
organic and inorganic is more significant when, nearly at the end of the section, the 
narrator dwells on a “half-heard melody” (Lighthouse 141). The text reads:  
And now as if the cleaning and the scrubbing and the scything and the mowing 
had drowned it there rose that half-heard melody, that intermittent music which 
the ear half catches but lets fall; a bark, a bleat; irregular, intermittent, yet 
somehow related; the hum of an insect, the tremor of cut grass, dissevered yet 
somehow belonging; the jar of a dorbeetle, the squeak of a wheel, loud, low, but 
mysteriously related; which the ear strains to bring together and is always on the 
verge of harmonizing… (Lighthouse 141) 
 This is another example in which the cyborgian narrator addresses the organism/machine 
dualism but does not place them in opposition to one another. The narrator fuses natural 
sounds (“a bark, a bleat… jar of a dorbeetle”) and technological sounds (“squeak of a 
wheel”) into a coalition through their sensibility through the “ear” (Lighthouse 141). 
Although the “ear” does not strictly necessitate a human ear, the phrases “somehow 
related” and “mysteriously related” demonstrate the narrator’s imaginative attempt at 
descriptively unifying the natural and machinic realms under a human comprehension. 





intelligibility is a failed one, as demonstrated through “the ear half catches but lets fall.” 
Nevertheless, the “half-heard melody” indeed remains a melody; although the passage is 
enigmatic to the human reader, the narratorial endeavor itself is a success through the 
unification of the organic and nonorganic realms and the double affirmation that the 
natural and technological sounds are both “related” to the human deeds such as 
“cleaning” and “mowing.” This merger of the organic and machinic realms exhibits the 
breakdown of second dualism, organism/machine, which the figure of the cyborg 
requires. 
The cyborgian consciousness in the section collapses the border between the 
material and the nonmaterial in a way that matches Haraway’s discussion of the 
physical/nonphysical dualism. She marks “the third distinction [as] a subset of the 
second,” meaning that the physical/nonphysical relationship is demonstrated through the 
machine, namely through technological manifestations in both embodied and 
disembodied forms (Manifesto 12). In discussing the miniaturization of machines, 
Haraway writes that “there was always the specter of the ghost in the machine.… Modern 
machines are quintessentially microelectronic devices: they are everywhere and they are 
invisible” (Manifesto 11-12). Similarly, there are instances in “Time Passes” that suggest 
that Woolf links the machine with the “specter of the ghost.” For example, during the 
first night, the text describes: 
when darkness fell, the stroke of the Lighthouse, which had laid itself with such 
authority upon the carpet in the darkness, tracing its pattern, came now in the 
softer light of spring mixed with moonlight gliding gently as if it laid its caress 





The narrator’s ascription of agency, through  “lingered stealthily” and “looked,” to the 
beacon of the lighthouse presents the light as a distinct entity, and a spectral one through 
its disembodiment. The agent, however, maintains its technological properties as it 
“trac[es] its pattern,” or is bound to its mechanical cycle as it spins around the lighthouse. 
This fusion of nonphysical and machinic attributes within a distinct entity demonstrates a 
similar logical move as Haraway’s understanding of the machine’s capacity to display 
both physical and nonphysical features. Remarkably, “the stroke of the Lighthouse,” 
mixes with “moonlight,” which associates the entity’s nonphysical and technological 
characteristics with natural, cosmically connotated ones; this, like the figure of the 
cyborg, further demonstrates permeability among the “Great Divides,” as discussed in the 
introduction (Species 15). In conjunction with the above quote, in which technological 
properties are embodied and sensible (“squeak of a wheel”), the addition of the machine’s 
capacity to maintain nonphysical attributes indicates that the cyborgian consciousness ties 
nonphysical perspectives and subjectivities to the machine. These perspectives and 
multiplicities are primarily expressed through the ascription of agency to nonhuman 
forms. 
Rooted in the understanding of the machine, the cyborgian consciousness directly 
demonstrates the permeability of the border between the physical and nonphysical. 
Consider the following passage, in which the narrator ascribes human agency to non-
physical entities through personification: 
Loveliness and stillness clasped hands in the bedroom, and among the shrouded 
jugs and sheeted chairs even the prying of the wind, and the soft nose of the 
clammy sea airs, rubbing, snuffling, iterating, and reiterating their questions – 





the air of pure integrity, as if the question they asked scarcely needed that they 
should answer: we remain. (Lighthouse 129) 
Loveliness and stillness are presented as amorphous and dispersed mixtures of sensible 
and insensible qualities. They have intangibly “clasped hands,” yet are given tangible 
characteristics such as “soft” and “clammy.” Although the paradoxical mixture of these 
qualities is inconceivable according a human understanding, the cyborgian consciousness 
is able to explore them through their personification as inquisitive beings. Their answer, 
“we remain,” shows that they are as inquisitive and conjecturing as humanity. Lily 
expresses the same inquisitive sentiment as she grieves over Mrs. Ramsey’s death: 
“Could things thrust their hands up and grip one; could the blade cut; the fist grasp? … 
For one moment she felt that if they both got up, here, now on the lawn, and demanded 
an explanation, why was it so short, why was it so inexplicable” (Lighthouse 180). In 
both of the two passages, manual connection (“clasped” and “grip one”) with other life 
forms is positioned at the crux of questions surrounding life and mortality (“Will you 
perish?” and “why was it so short”). Although the human questions of making sense of 
themselves and the world are unsuccessful and unanswered once met with the fact of 
cosmic indifference, the nonphysical entities mutually assure the other of their 
persistence. The narrator’s ascription of physical characteristics to the nonphysical 
entities, in conjunction with their inquisitiveness which is associatively human, 
demonstrates an attempt to explore perspectives and subjectivities only yielded by the 
collapse of the physical/nonphysical dualism. Rooted in the shared existential 
inquisitiveness amongst human and nonhuman life forms, the entities partake in the 





The cyborgian consciousness in the section further displays similarities to 
Haraway’s figure of the cyborg, such as its decentering of humanity through “historical 
transformations” (Manifesto 7). Haraway writes that the cyborg’s “two joined centers” of 
“imagination and material reality” bring about “any possibility of historical 
transformation” (Manifesto 7). The nonphysical entities described above constitute an 
imaginative endeavor by the narrator to present a non-anthropocentric experience; they 
are, furthermore, non-historical beings, or outside the limits of a human history. 
However, both these kinds of entities are affected by the First World War, a major 
historical event occurring within the span of ten years in the “Time Passes” section. Yet, 
this event never breaches into the foreground of the narratorial perspective; instead, a 
certain distance is maintained, and the war’s corresponding pain and tensions are 
presented by way of allusion and suggestion. Through the imaginative portrayal of non-
historical beings that are impacted by the “material reality” of the war, the cyborgian 
consciousness is able to bring about a “historical transformation” of the First World War. 
This is primarily exhibited in the war’s backgrounding; while its battles are waged at a 
distance from the house, the narrator is able to privilege the perspectives and 
subjectivities of natural, organic, and machinic agencies. The war’s distanced position 
further removes any distinctly human perspectives, thereby exhibiting Haraway’s fourth 
“wound,” in which humanity is decentered from its history and a temporally fixed 
teleology (Species 10).  
Consider how the war is continually given a non-anthropocentric presence in 
“Time Passes.” The description of Andrew Ramsay’s death, for example, is placed in 
rigid brackets along with all other events that occur in the solely human world: “clearly 





something falling. [A shell exploded. Twenty or thirty young men were blown up in 
France, among them Andrew Ramsay, whose death, mercifully, was instantaneous]” 
(Lighthouse 133). Within the brackets, the narratorial focus is on the battlefield, yet the 
brackets and the specific event’s contrast with the ambiguity preceding it (“something 
falling”) indicate that his death is not the primary focus of the passage. Although, 
presumably, the “something” is the falling shell, the ambiguity serves to remove the 
specifically human experience from the war. Instead of further expression along human 
lines, the section privileges nonhuman expression of Andrew Ramsay’s death through the 
landscape. Shortly after the brackets, the text reads, “There was the silent apparition of an 
ashen-coloured ship for instance, come, gone; there was a purplish stain upon the bland 
surface of the sea as if something had boiled and bled, invisibly, beneath” (Lighthouse 
134). Although the passage is a testament to the wide-reaching aspect of the war, it is 
more significantly a reformulation in terms of hierarchy, as the reference lacks all 
mention of a specifically human perspective and instead privileges the landscape’s 
subjectivity in regards to the war. Significantly, the landscape is not an entirely natural 
one through the “silent apparition” of a ship. Yet, the cyborgian consciousness presents 
the landscape as empathetic through its suffering of the same effects of heat (“boiled”) by 
which Andrew is blown up. The paragraph ends with a brief, seaside rumination on “how 
beauty outside mirrored beauty within” (Lighthouse 134). The trauma of the war, then, is 
not an exclusively interior and human struggle. The expression of Andrew’s death 
through the landscape’s analogous features demonstrates an imaginative attempt to 
remove human experience from a traditionally male event. The passage thereby serves as 
a prime example of ecofeminist writing through its denial of Andrew’s masculine 





of two foci, both that of the battlefield and the seaside landscape, presents the suffering 
and grief as permeable between the two locales and shows how the section searches for a 
cyborg’s fluid understanding and worldview. In so far as war is a clash of cultures, the 
multiple foci present an instance of natureculture through the integration of Andrew 
Ramsay’s suffering into the natural world. 
Although “Time Passes” does not grant humans the privileged focus of the 
narrative, there are still humans within the house during its natural course of entropy and 
decay. Far from the clamor of the “universe… battling and tumbling,” another reference 
to the war, Mrs. McNab, the housekeeper, remains in the house long after the family 
leaves and Mrs. Ramsay dies (Lighthouse 135). Her perspective is profoundly not one of 
egoism, and represents the non-dominating perspective of the unaffected hybridity found 
in the sphere of the house. She ruminates, “Let the wind blow; let the poppy seed itself 
and the carnation mate with the cabbage. Let the swallow build in the drawing-room” 
(Lighthouse 138). Mrs. McNab leaves the house, yet in her absence, invites the 
“swallow” to build its home within the boundaries of the human world, or that which 
previously excluded the greater forces of nature. She promotes not only organic hybridity 
and the formation of zoons (“let the… carnation mate with the cabbage”), but the fusion 
of the natural world with that of the domestic.  
As the house also forms the communal hub in which the characters pursue 
conventional social habits such as dining, reading, and painting, Mrs. McNab also invites 
the collapse of the boundary between nature and culture. Indeed, her inclusion of natural 
forces constitutes an early attempt at imagining a natureculture. For example, when she 
returns, accompanied by Mrs. Bast and her son, George, they restore the house to its 





them… fetched up from oblivion all the Waverley novels and a tea-set one morning; in 
the afternoon restored to sun and air” (Lighthouse 139). The characters remove the 
cultural items from the house and place them outside the domestic realm and in the open 
air of nature, in which they can receive the benefit of the sun’s warmth and light. Their 
newfound placement symbolically emphasizes the blend of nature and culture, as the text 
describes “long rows of books, black as ravens once, now white-stained, breeding pale 
mushrooms and secreting furtive spiders” (Lighthouse 140). The natural forces that were 
responsible for the decay and entropy of the novels are now responsible for the items’ 
safety and their “restor[ation] to sun and air.” However, the books are not completely 
salvaged. The books, traditionally conceived to be only enjoyed by humans, are 
repurposed by the natural realm as a generative and fertile place (“breeding”) of 
habitation. The passage’s position in the “Time Passes” section indicates a historically 
rooted, material infolding; presumably, being decomposers, the mushrooms use the 
material of the books to which they cling as substantial nutrients. Welcomed by Mrs. 
McNab and symbolized by the Waverly novels, the fusion of the human and nonhuman 
realms exhibits a narratorial inclination to unite the two in a natureculture. 
Significantly, the restoration of the novels and tea-set from their state of disrepair 
is connoted positively and the characters’ cleaning methods are not presented as 
explicitly dominating; the greater, cosmic forces are still at play. For example, Mrs. 
McNab sees a ghost: “the telescope fitted itself to Mrs. McNab’s eyes, and in a ring of 
light she saw the old gentleman, lean as a rake, wagging his head… Some said he was 
dead; some said she was dead. Which was it?” (Lighthouse 140). The spectral figure is 
distinct through the description of physical attributes such as “lean” and “head.” The 





asks, “which was it?” Significantly, the telescope becomes an example in which a 
machine is given agency through “fit[ing] itself,” furthering the lack of boundaries 
between humanity and machines. In contrast to Mr. Ramsay’s moment of isolation in 
which he “spared no phantom,” Mrs. McNab’s perception of the landscape in this 
instance is indeed an ecofeminist one through its acknowledgement of a nonphysical 
entity, a previously unrecognized other (Lighthouse 44). The perceptive ability to discern 
nonphysical entities exhibits the cyborgian consciousness as embodied in Mrs. McNab 
and foreshadows its effects upon the family’s return to the house after the war. 
Indeed, Mrs. McNab’s ecofeminist recognition of a previously marginalized 
figure displays the goal of Haraway’s figure of the cyborg: an inclusionary 
consciousness, or a collective source for expression. According to Haraway, the cyborg’s 
comprehensiveness does not arise from “an origin story in the ‘Western,’ humanist 
sense” (Manifesto 8). She describes a Western origin story as a “myth of original unity, 
fullness, bliss and terror… from whom all humans must separate, the task of individual 
development and of history” (Manifesto 8). The progression of “individual development” 
from essential sources (“original unity, fullness”) is an anthropocentric mode of defining 
a singular human by her intrinsically determining characteristics and by ignoring the 
other human and nonhuman factors that constitute her. By rejecting human individuation 
and essentialism, the cyborg originates from communal expression – in which all types of 
perspectives and subjectivities fundamentally affect definition and consciousness. 
Conversely to the “Western, humanist sense” of myth, Haraway’s myth of the cyborg “is 
about transgressed boundaries, potent fusions, and dangerous possibilities” (Manifesto 





consciousness, distributed amongst several human characters and nonhuman entities, 
embraces those three aspects of the cyborgian creation myth.  
Since the novel as a whole is an elegiac one, the characters are tasked with 
making sense of Mrs. Ramsay’s passing; upon their return to the house, the characters 
grieve and emotionally come to grips with their mortality in terms of a cosmos that is 
indifferent to them. After the period of ten years, Lily’s act of completing the painting is 
an accomplishment in therapeutic recovery. In more depth, reconsider the passage of 
Lily’s inquisitions as she completes the painting beside Mr. Carmichael: 
Could it be… that this was life?–startling, unexpected, unknown? For one 
moment she felt that if they both got up, here, now on the lawn, and demanded an 
explanation, why was it so short, why so inexplicable, said it with violence, as 
two fully equipped human beings from whom nothing should be hid might speak, 
then beauty would roll itself up; the space would fill; those empty flourishes 
would form into shape; if they shouted loud enough Mrs. Ramsay would return. 
“Mrs. Ramsay!” she said aloud, “Mrs. Ramsay!” The tears ran down her face. 
(Lighthouse 180) 
In the passage, Lily’s grief is psychologically manifest in the “flourishes… form[ing] 
shape,” thereby imbuing the canvassed painting with Mrs. Ramsay’s memory. This 
reading is further supported by the last lines of the novel, in which Lily “looked at her 
canvas; it was blurred… she drew a line there, in the center. It was done; it was finished” 
(Lighthouse 209). Through the “blurred” vision of her tears, Lily imaginatively perceives 
and optically creates a space that is psychologically representational of the cause, Mrs. 
Ramsay’s death, that accounts for those tears. Given this reading, the passage 





possibilities” are introduced by Lily Briscoe’s “violen[t]” and daring questions about 
“why was [life] so short, why so inexplicable” (Manifesto 14). Secondly, “potent fusions” 
take place upon the remembrance of Mrs. Ramsay and the progression of the painting: 
“the space would fill; those empty flourishes would form into shape; if they shouted loud 
enough Mrs. Ramsay would return” (Manifesto 14). Lily, through distortions of time and 
space that were introduced in “Time Passes,” is able to blend the artificially created space 
in the painting with the temporal memory of Mrs. Ramsay. This fusion, in conjunction 
with Lily’s sentiment that the painting “remained for ever,” necessarily entails the third 
aspect of “transgressed boundaries” through the breaching of mortal impermanence in 
Lily’s recreation of Mrs. Ramsay (Lighthouse 179; Manifesto 14). The three aspects of 
the cyborgian creation myth are bound into the labor of the painting’s completion. 
Furthermore, such a form of painting on the space of the canvas is akin to the figure of 
the cyborg’s “mark[ing] out a self-consciously constructed space… on the basis of 
conscious coalition, of affinity” (Manifesto 16).  
The cyborg champions imaginative perception, as demonstrated through Lily’s 
vision, and especially perceptions gathered from a multiplicity of sources. The lighthouse 
is one such object perceived from multiple vantage points. James, for example, “looked at 
the Lighthouse… So that was the Lighthouse, was it? No, the other was also the 
Lighthouse. For nothing was simply one thing. The other Lighthouse was true too” 
(Lighthouse 186). The passage of time from James’ early childhood to his young 
adulthood offers him a sense of maturity in the third section, and he is now able to view 
the lighthouse with a double vision, seeing both the formidable structure in front of him, 
and “the other” lighthouse he saw from a physical and temporal distance (Lighthouse 





space and symbolically occupies an imaginative one. In a similar fashion, Mrs. Ramsay is 
a figure seen from various vantage points, as an embodied presence in the first section 
and through others’ memories of Mrs. Ramsay in the third. Mrs. Ramsay’s memory takes 
a conceptual form through Lily’s recollection (“she could remember the look on Mrs. 
Ramsay’s face”) and through the infused spirit of Mrs. Ramsay onto the canvas 
(Lighthouse 150). The existence and sensibility of the lighthouse and Mrs. Ramsay in the 
physical and imaginative spheres displays the same schema as the cyborg’s composition 
“of both imagination and material reality” (Manifesto 7). Furthermore, the distribution of 
both temporal and spatial restrictions across a myriad of perspectives works towards the 
collective consciousness required by the cyborg. The multiple perspectives offered by the 
cyborgian consciousness directly combat the narrowmindedness of egoism in which there 
is only the self’s privileged perspective. 
The cyborg acts against dominating male egoism by removing any reliance on it 
for existence. In her feminist essay A Room of One’s Own, in which she calls for the 
inclusion of women in the literary tradition, Woolf scorns patriarchal egoism. She 
describes an experience of reading a novel by an anonymous male author:  
after reading a chapter or two a shadow seemed to lie across the page. It was a 
straight dark bar, a shadow shaped something like the letter ‘I’. One began 
dodging this way and that to catch a glimpse of the landscape behind it. Whether 
that was indeed a tree or a woman walking I was not quite sure. (Room 98) 
As demonstrated through her imaginative inability to discern the “landscape” behind the 
male ego, she sees this male self-centeredness as a detrimental force that inhibits 
perception. To counteract this force in To the Lighthouse, Woolf implements a cyborgian 





the egoism of Mr. Ramsay and Mr. Tansley, and disparages anthropocentrism by 
attempting to remove a distinctly human form of comprehension; this is achieved through 
championing new perspectives and subjectivities centered around shared collectivities of 
imagination and material reality. The cyborgian consciousness renounces the sharp 
divisions between human and animal, organism and machine, and physical and non-
physical entities. In “Time Passes,” the narratorial perspective privileges fusions among 
the three dualisms and, completely devoid of egoism and its narrowminded perspective, 
the landscape is liberated.  
Entailed in the disparaged dualisms of animal/human, organism/machine, and 
physical/non-physical, is the collapse of nature/culture. Mrs. McNab’s cyborgian 
perception, in which she invites the collapse of the division between the domestic and 
natural realms, and the landscape’s empathetic integration into the human affair of 
Andrew Ramsay’s death invites a conception of natureculture as a merger of the spheres 
that human and nonhuman forms respectively embody. In the next novel discussed, 
Between the Acts, Woolf expands upon the idea of natureculture, encapsulating the 













Chapter II: Zoons and Critters in Between the Acts 
 
Although both novels respond to the same form of patriarchal egoism, To the 
Lighthouse highlights its self-privileging tendencies whereas Between the Acts draws 
attention to the egoism’s capacity to project the status of a less-than other on to 
traditionally non-masculine groups as a means of upholding its dualisms. The subjugation 
of these groups, which include women, critters, and queer artists, takes two forms: 
compartmentalization and formal definition. Bartholomew Oliver and his son Giles, the 
two characters who are most representative of the patriarchal forces, insist on rigid 
compartmentalization in addressing the character of William Dodge; Bartholomew 
categorizes Dodge according to his occupation as an artist, while Giles classifies him 
according to his queer sexual orientation. For example, Bartholomew displays a 
photograph picturing a dog, a horse, and a pair of his male and female ancestors. 
Afterward, “William Dodge was still looking at the lady” (Acts 32). This allows 
Bartholomew to have a realization: “Ah,’ said Bartholomew… ‘you’re an artist.’ Dodge 
denied it, for the second time in half an hour” (Acts 32). In this moment, Bartholomew 
reveals his assumption that Dodge is an artist on the grounds that he was “still looking” at 
the lady in a picture, showing that his insistent compartmentalization is not only hasty, as 
“Dodge denie[s] it,” but also includes the photographed woman as an other through her 
figure as an aestheticized and artistic object. Dodge’s queer sexuality, moreover, poses 
him as an other in Giles’ prejudiced understanding; he conceives Dodge as “a toady; a 
lickspittle; not a downright plain man of his senses; but a teaser and twitcher… not a man 
to have straightforward love for a woman” (Acts 38). Not only does Giles categorize 





phrase “not a downright plain man of his senses.” Giles bears animosity towards Dodge 
on the grounds that it is not according to his regimented worldview to be queer. Both 
Bartholomew and Giles display the patriarchal tendency to project the status of a 
compartmentalized other in such a way that reinforces the same traditional dualisms that 
natureculture undermines. 
William Dodge also emblematizes the phenomenon of formal definition and the 
patriarchal tendency to compartmentalize through shape. Upon his introduction, Dodge is 
first described as “an unknown young man with tow-coloured hair and a twisted face” 
(Acts 25). Significantly, the word “tow” used to describe Dodge’s blond hair has a two-
fold figurative meaning in this context: the first, pertaining to his relationship with Mrs. 
Manresa, his companion who pulls him along as a “guest” to the community, and the 
second, “a bundle of untwisted natural or manmade fibres” (Acts 25; OED 4). The latter 
definition of “tow” allows for a conception of Dodge as an undistinguished and 
nondescript being of natural and artificial substances; the vagueness of his “fibres” in his 
presentation to the reader verges on amorphousness, as he lacks a clear definitional make-
up and physical composition. This amorphousness is exacerbated when juxtaposed with 
the moment of his introduction to the human characters: “Mrs. Manresa added, to make 
all shipshape: ‘He’s an artist” (Acts 25). This furthers the contrast between his private, 
amorphous self-hood and his public compartmentalization according to his societal role. 
Indeed, it is only when in the presence of other characters that he is given form, through 
the addition of “a gentleman; witness socks and trousers; brainy – tie spotted…” (Acts 
25). Dodge, although publicly compartmentalized, is presented as someone whose 





Furthermore, Dodge’s role according to patriarchal society suggests the 
regimentation and formation needed for patriarchal dualisms. Consider the passage when 
William Dodge expresses the wish to be heard, thinking, “at school they held me under a 
bucket of dirty water, Mrs. Swithin; when I looked up, the world was dirty, Mrs. Swithin; 
so I married; but my child’s not my child, Mrs. Swithin. I’m a half-man Mrs. Swithin; a 
flickering, mind-divided little snake in the grass…’ So he wished to say; but said 
nothing” (Acts 46). Dodge’s memory of being bullied as a child manifests itself 
psychologically through his self-perception as a pejorative less-than-human “half-man,” 
and his idiomatic usage of “mind-divided little snake in the grass.” This specific use of 
the idiom shows that even his very reliance on language, in so far as it corresponds to the 
psychological impact of his bullying, has been warped and imposed on him by the 
patriarchal forces that function to project him as an other. The passage, while 
foreshadowing the communal refrain, “Dispersed are we,” through the dispersion of a 
collectively shared consciousness (“mind-divided”), speaks to Dodge’s deeply-held 
resentment around the source of his otherness (Acts 59). The addition of “So he wished to 
say; but said nothing” affirms Dodge’s sentiments as ones that need to be expressed, yet 
remain stifled within him. William Dodge’s self-perceived otherness as a psychological 
detriment poses a critique against the patriarchal dualisms which mean to confine him as 
such.  
 Furthermore, the patriarchal forces at play in the novel are presented as directly 
responsible for the suppression and inexpression of psychological pain. First consider 
when the young child, George, is frightened: “Up he leapt, toppling in his fright, and saw 
coming towards him a terrible peaked eyeless monster moving on legs, brandishing 





of his cowardice and for showing and not suppressing his emotional shock at the scare 
(Acts 10). Although, at first glance, the use of the word “monster” seems to imply a 
narratorial understanding of animals as an other, the “monster” is actually “Mr. Oliver 
crumpl[ing] the paper which he had cocked into a snout” (Acts 10). Bartholomew mimics 
the animal realm for the sake of instilling horror into the boy. The conception of animals 
as feared creatures works to position animals as others from an anthropocentric 
perspective and, in turn, forms the basis for anti-ecological beliefs and practices. 
George’s fright shows how the anti-ecological belief, holding nonhuman entities as an 
other, is not inherent in him, and rather is instilled in the young boy by Bartholomew’s 
animal parody. Moreover, the boy’s tearful reaction is implemented against him through 
mockery (“A cry-baby – a cry-baby”), showing how, like the memory Dodge provides, 
the patriarchal forces sustain the other’s subjugation by suppressing its deeply-held 
resentment.  
 Indeed, the suppression of articulation that arises as a result of the patriarchal 
dualisms creates a problem for the human community. Even in issues of great importance 
such as the imminent war, Giles Oliver “had no command of metaphor. Only the 
ineffective word ‘hedgehog’ illustrated his vision of Europe, bristling with guns, poised 
with planes. At any moment guns would rake that land into furrows; planes splinter 
Bolney Minster into smithereens and blast the Folly” (Acts 34). Giles, lacking linguistic 
mastery (“no command of metaphor… ineffective word”), cannot accurately convey 
Europe’s condition on the brink of the Second World War. Remarkably, Giles relies on 
animal terminology to comprehend the situation. Although Giles’ and the hedgehog are 
not materially infolded, as “hedgehog” is maintained as a linguistic sign, the mediation of 





realm for intelligibility and expression. Although Giles is just one of many characters that 
perceive the world and themselves through nonhuman likenesses, his understanding of 
nonhuman entities as others identifies his character as a hypocritical one. 
 To counteract the patriarchal mode of upholding its dualisms through 
compartmentalization and formal definition, the novel champions that which is 
amorphous and defies traditional conceptions of natural shape. The characteristic of 
amorphousness establishes itself thematically through natural and nonhuman imagery 
that resists the solely human realm for comprehension. This resistance of human 
intelligibility results in an uninterpretable quality that eludes the strict definition and 
clarity demanded by regimentation under the patriarchal forces. The amorphous 
characteristics, applied to several characters by themselves and by the narrator, are 
precisely the worldview set forward by the zoon according to Haraway’s understanding. 
Amorphousness conveys a worldview in which the “Great Divides,” and specifically the 
boundary between human and nonhuman, are broken down and made osmotic (Species 
15).  
The collapse of the human/nonhuman dualism in the novel is perceived through 
amorphous imagery that fuses the solely human realm with the nonhuman realm, thereby 
making human life intelligible through nonhuman forces. For example, the above passage 
concerning Dodge’s self-suppression of resentment continues with a description of the 
wind: “and the breeze went lolloping along the corridors, blowing the blinds out” (Acts 
46). When compared with the nonphysical entities in the section of “Time Passes,” such 
as loveliness and stillness, it is clear that the breeze is given agency through the action of 
“lolloping” and its effects on the blinds, yet it remains without a distinct shape; while the 





narrator of Between the Acts withholds such physical descriptions of the breeze 
(Lighthouse 129). In a narrative which stresses the patriarchal effects of order and form, 
the breeze’s amorphousness constitutes an effort to elude the forces which mean to 
constrain it. Remarkably, the breeze matches the silence that Dodge maintains in his lack 
of speech, and, read as a parallel of “Time Passes,” the passage frames human existence 
in terms of the greater natural forces at work.  
As discussed in the introduction, Haraway describes four “wounds” human 
exceptionalism receives, in which humanity’s “unique excellence” of teleology is 
historically marginalized (Species 10). Likewise, the quality of amorphousness in the 
novel temporally disparages human exceptionalism. Mrs. Swithin, the matriarch of the 
Oliver family, attempts to imaginatively overlay the present’s space with that of the past 
in pondering a time long before the present moment. She uses her “favorite reading – an 
Outline of History,” as a foundational base from which she can then fold the past into the 
present, rather than psychically retaining her human self in a transportation into the past 
(Acts 8). The text reads: 
she… had spent the hours between three and five thinking of rhododendron 
forests in Piccadilly; when the entire continent, not then, she understood, divided 
by a channel, was all one; populated, she understood, by elephant-bodied, seal-
necked, heaving, surging, slowly writhing, and, she supposed, barking monsters; 
the iguanodon, the mammoth, and the mastodon; from whom presumably, she 
thought, jerking the window open, we descend. (Acts 8) 
The passage works to situate the present moment as geologically and environmentally 
different yet linked through the evolutionary preservation and “descen[t]” of life from the 





and “populated, she understood” are then substituted with “she supposed,” demonstrating 
the psychological shift in focus from the text’s reading to her mind’s eye. Remarkably, 
the combination of “elephant-bodied” and “seal-necked” grants the prehistorical entities a 
quality of amorphousness, as these descriptors correspond to specific, contemporary 
animals that serve to merge and infold the elephant and seal parts with the brontosaurus-
like entity. In combination with the actions of “heaving, surging, [and] slowly writhing,” 
the descriptors refrain from giving the entity a conceivable form as a whole, instead 
drawing attention to its parts and actions of vague mobility. As this temporal overlay 
describes the past as a shared experience among critters, it disparages human 
exceptionalism. Mrs. Swithin’s non-anthropocentric understanding of the past constitutes 
a cyborgian perception, furthered through the fusion of the past and present, and the 
merging of the human and animal realms through “we descend.” Mrs. Swithin refers to 
the Darwinian “wound” as laid out by Haraway, as she places human origins in the world 
of other critters (Species 10).   
This merger continues further in her perception of Grace, the housekeeper. The 
narrator describes her perceptual shift from the past to the present, as “it took her five 
seconds in actual time, in mind time ever so much longer, to separate Grace herself, with 
blue china on a tray, from the leather-covered grunting monster who was about, as the 
door opened, to demolish a whole tree in the green steaming undergrowth of the primeval 
forest” (Acts 8). The passage attests to Mrs. Swithin’s difficulty in shifting temporalities 
and the causal connection between her perceptive imagination of the past and her vision 
of the housekeeper as “a leather-covered grunting monster.” In this moment, the past and 
present blur together around the nexus point, Grace, as she takes on human and 





described by Haraway, since Grace’s very shape and definition are informed by Mrs. 
Swithin’s “imaginative reconstruction of the past” (Acts 8). The nonhuman, prehistorical 
critter from the above passage, “barking monster,” is incorporated into a description of 
Grace’s personhood through “grunting monster.” Yet, Mrs. Swithin’s sight does not 
detract from Grace’s humanity, since Grace’s self is no more defined as a “maid in a print 
frock and white apron” than she is “a beast in a swamp” (Acts 8). The juxtaposition of 
“maid” and “beast” presents Grace in an amorphous way that neither wholly incapsulates 
her humanity nor her nonhuman characteristics. Grace’s interruption shatters Mrs. 
Swithin’s recollection and the “primeval forest” in her mind’s eye that symbolizes the 
actual deforestation performed to sustain their present community. Furthermore, the 
sound and sight of the birds outside the open window encourage Mrs. Swithin “to 
continue her imaginative reconstruction of the past,” environmentally rooting the 
perception of humanity’s descent from the “primeval forest” and its creatures. This in 
turn situates the historical infolding at the meeting point between traditional conceptions 
of nature, through the “birds…singing,” and culture, through the serving of tea in “blue 
china on a tray” (Acts 8). Along with Bartholomew’s retired status from the Indian Civil 
Service, the serving of tea in the passage is imperialistically connotated through the East 
India Company’s conquest of India. By situating this ritualized, cultural moment of tea 
time with imperialist allusions at such a critical moment of temporal overlay, the narrator 
radically and thoroughly blends nature and culture. Overall, this early moment in the 
narrative serves as an introductory step in imagining a natureculture. 
Now contrast Mrs. Swithin’s matriarchal recollection with a patriarchal 
understanding of the past. Giles’ remembrance of prehistory is fundamentally self-





which Haraway’s four “wounds” against human exceptionalism respond (Species 10). 
Giles’ recollection is presented as the result of a childish fantasy. In taking a walking to 
the Barn, 
He kicked – a flinty yellow stone, a sharp stone, edged as if cut by a savage for an 
arrow. A barbaric stone; a pre-historic. Stone-kicking was a child’s game. He 
remembered the rules. By the rules of the game, one stone, the same stone, must 
be kicked to the goal. Say a gate, or a tree. He played it alone. The gate was a 
goal; to be reached in ten. (Acts 61) 
As seen from the passage, Giles relationship with the past is presented through the 
mediation of a children’s game that stresses obedience and regimentation through 
adhering to the “rules,” linearity through consecutive counting, and teleology through the 
goal of ten kicks. Giles interacts with a tangible item from prehistory, a carved stone, yet 
its newfound purpose as the object of a game highlights his lack of reverence. The 
passage also presents Giles’s contemptuous perception of the past (“savage” and 
“barbaric”) as one that moves to dominate and devalue the indigenous peoples who “cut” 
the stone “for an arrow.” In light of Mrs. Swithin’s recollection, Giles’ memory is 
shrewdly narrow, as the furthest point of his remembrance from the present moment is 
his own childhood.  
Just as Mrs. Swithin’s “imaginative reconstruction of the past” demonstrates an 
overlay of her psychological state onto the present moment, Giles’ physical reenactment 
of his youth is overlaid with his own mentality – one evocative of hell (Acts 8). The 
passage continues with the merger of Giles’ psychological state and his kicking game: 
“The first kick was Manresa (lust). The second, Dodge (perversion). The third himself 





ten” (Acts 61). Along with the above phrase, “the gate was a goal,” the passage includes 
the human characters and their sins in a list that is reminiscent of the nine layers of 
Dante’s inferno and its vestibule of cowards. In this fantasy, Giles is able to 
compartmentalize each person according to their sin. By placing himself amongst the 
others in his rumination, he admits that his relationship to the past is one where he must 
account for his sins. Furthermore, the stone’s kicking situates the passage as a childish 
reenactment of the myth of Sisyphus, doomed to roll a stone up a hill for eternity in the 
underworld. Along with the premise of a childhood game, the myth reinforces Giles’ 
remembrance as a futile and foolish one. Unlike Mrs. Swithin’s imagination that serves 
as a means for liberation, Giles’ reconstruction serves as an anthropocentric confinement.  
Giles’ worldview of human exceptionalism continues further, when he reaches the 
gate. He sees: 
there, couched in the grass, curled in an olive green ring, was a snake. Dead? No, 
choked with a toad in its mouth. The snake was unable to swallow; the toad was 
unable to die. A spasm made the ribs contract; blood oozed. It was birth the 
wrong way round – a monstrous inversion. So, raising his foot, he stamped on 
them. The mass crushed and slithered. (Acts 61) 
The hellish undertones are emphasized through the continuous and mutual suffering of 
the snake and the toad. In the passage, Giles’ psychological perception of the past, 
carrying with it the above-mentioned hellish undertones, continues to overlay the present 
moment and his physical surroundings; when his focus is drawn to the snake and toad, his 
confining and infernal psychological state accounts for his perception of the pair’s 
circumstances as profoundly unnatural (“monstrous inversion”). Strikingly, Giles uses his 





By serving as the meeting point between the human world and the earth, the human foot 
suppresses the nonhuman realm and its entities back into the earth and the past from 
which it “oozed.”  
 Furthermore, the snake and toad act as an “enclosure of zoons” (Species 249). 
Indeed, in their moment of static tension, the snake and toad are “material, specific, non-
self-identical, and semiotically active” (Species 249). The snake and the toad together 
form a unified composite through physically infolding into one another; Giles perceives 
them not merely as a snake and a toad, but as a singular “monstrous inversion” at the 
center of his hellish reverie. This psychological overlay creates an understanding in 
which the critters are “risk[ing] fleshly acts of interpretation” (Species 249). Due to 
Giles’ limited and confined relationship with natural history in which he distinctly poses 
the critter as an other, he is unable to understand and interpret the “fleshly act,” and 
crushes the compound animal (Species 249). Under Giles’ limited comprehension, 
furthered by “Dead? No,” the snake and toad serve as a challenge to his 
compartmentalized understanding of life and death in the organic world (Acts 61). 
Lacking clear physical division, the snake and toad constitute a way for Woolf to push 
the boundaries of life and death, as the pair cling to one another at an indeterminate point 
between the two states. His crushing of the zoon positions his character at the center of 
anti-ecological practices in the novel, as he denies the creature a presence in his 
worldview. Remarkably, Mrs. Manresa later notices that his shoes are “bloodstained” and 
“[feels]: I am the Queen, he my hero, my sulky hero” (Acts 66). Giles’ new status as a 
hero attests to how the zoon’s remains have partially infolded into his character, as it is 
the zoon’s remains on his “bloodstained” shoes that account for his new heroic position. 





greater natureculture around it, melding together natural with unnatural, and animal with 
human.  
The fusions provided by a natureculture affirm the shared existence amongst all 
critters. Combining the natural and cultural spheres, the critters that compose a 
natureculture are mutually dependent on one another for their very existence. As the 
snake-toad zoon demonstrates, shared experience of life and death poses “species 
interdependence” as “the name of the worlding game on earth” (Species 19). Similarly, 
Woolf positions the human and nonhuman entities, and therefore the cultural and natural 
realms the entities embody, as being mutually dependent on one another for meaning and 
survival. A butterfly, for example, is presented as being dependent on the human realm 
for its remaining alive. In a narratorial aside that occurs during descriptions of the 
humans, the text reads: “The fire greyed, then glowed, and the tortoiseshell butterfly beat 
on the lower pane of the window; beat, beat, beat; repeating that if no human being ever 
came, never, never, never, the books would be mouldy, the fire out and the tortoiseshell 
butterfly dead on the pane” (Acts 13). Although this passage is a brief digression in which 
the narrator shifts focus from the human characters, it serves as a reminder of the entities 
that are often dismissed as nonessential others and not included in human conceptions of 
culture. 
The novel develops “species interdependence” as a fundamental aspect of the 
community, yet one that is ignored by most of the human characters (Species 19). 
Consider the narrator’s rumination on the Barn in which she states, “The Barn was 
empty. Mice slid in and out of holes or stood upright, nibbling. Swallows were busy with 
straw in pockets of earth in the rafters. Countless beetles and insects of various sorts 





is indeed “empty,” a variety of animal life infolds into the walls and structure of the Barn 
itself. Thus, the animal realm is presented as in part reliant on the human realm for 
various forms of habitation. The passage is strikingly similar to Haraway’s description of 
her own body in which “bacteria, fungi, protists, and such” are housed (Species 1). For 
the human characters in the community, the barn serves as the cultural hub where the 
pageant play is announced via placard and where the play will eventually recommence 
when it rains. By situating the Barn as a symbol of culture that is shaped and constituted 
by animals, Woolf firmly sets the community as a natureculture. However, most of the 
human characters do not acknowledge the critters that infold into the barn’s structure and 
are thereby ignorant to the implication of natureculture. Mrs. Sands, for example, who 
arrives at the barn shortly after the above narratorial description, is blind to the animals 
that live in it, as “butterflies she never saw; mice were only black pellets in kitchen 
drawers” (Acts 62). Although the barn is not the only shared space, humans are shown as 
unaware of and unamused at this co-habitation. 
 Indeed, most of the human community is presented as deluded through their 
refusal to acknowledge the aspects of nature that surround them. The narrator remarks 
that “it was a pity that the man who had built Pointz Hall had pitched the house in a 
hollow, when beyond the flower garden and the vegetables there was this stretch of high 
ground. Nature had provided a site for a house; man had built his house in a hollow” 
(Acts 9). The Hall, a traditional place for culture in which the human characters gather, is 
positioned in an imperfect setting, as “the man who had built Pointz Hall” did not build it 
on high ground which “Nature had provided.” The aspect of “pity” arises from the lost 
opportunity to assimilate with nature, implying that the setting would have been better at 





and playwright responsible for the pageant play’s script, co-produces the performance 
with nature. The pageant play, functioning as the predominant cultural production in the 
novel, is remediated of any human exceptionalism through its natural setting. The 
narrator agrees with Miss La Trobe in her decision to have the stage amidst nature:  
There were plenty of seats for everybody. But some preferred to sit on the ground. 
Certainly Miss La Trobe had spoken the truth when she said; ‘The very place for 
a pageant!’ The lawn was as flat as the floor of a theatre. The terrace, rising, made 
a natural stage. The trees barred the stage like pillars. And the human figure was 
seen to great advantage against the background of sky. (Acts 47) 
The passage presents the play in an ecological framework in which both the humans and 
the natural world are able to partake in its production. Through the simile, “trees barred 
the stage like pillars,” the narrator equalizes both the trees and pillars, as respective 
symbols of nature and culture, without negating the characteristics that set them apart. 
Although the remark that “the human figure was seen to great advantage against the 
background of sky” implies an anthropocentric focus to the production, it also attests to 
the perceptual benefits of humanity’s integration with nature. As a whole, the ecological 
framework of the play positions the production as a feature of natureculture in which any 
anthropocentric sentiment is undermined by the nonhuman forces that repeatedly disrupt 
the play.  
The play’s integration with nature portrays the play as a brief instance of 
natureculture in which the cultural and natural realms infold into one another. First 
consider a passage in which the narrator shows the animals to be participating in the play, 
thereby deconstructing the barriers meant to keep them at bay. For example, at one such 





very cows joined in. Walloping, tail lashing, the reticence of nature was undone, and the 
barriers which should divide Man the Master from the Brute were dissolved. Then the 
dogs joined in!” (Acts 109). As the animals are participatory audience members (“joined 
in”), they can experience the cultural production of the play alongside the human 
characters. Miss La Trobe’s play presents a temporal space that ranges from Medieval to 
present-day England, yet this artificial construction is shattered by the cows and dogs 
rushing into the audience. The collapse of the play’s artificiality, in which the temporal 
and spatial boundaries are transgressed, is presented as a liberating moment; the narrator 
explicitly states that the “barriers,” that divide patriarchal figures and those they cast as 
the other “were dissolved” in the chaos. This dissonant moment results in a dispersed 
consciousness that, much like the cyborgian consciousness, crosses social and 
imaginative realities in order to unite the components of patriarchal dualisms.  
Similar to the cyborg’s collapse of the organism/machine dualism, the breakdown 
of dualisms in the novel entails the merger of animal and technological realms. Indeed, 
the play is repeatedly interrupted by human, animal, and technological causes that create 
opportunities for a reformulation of human existence in terms of a natureculture. For 
instance, Mrs. Swithin, looking at the swallows “flitting from rafter to rafter,” once again 
ruminates on the prehistoric age. She thinks, “Across Africa, across France they had 
come to nest here…before there was a channel, when the earth, upon which the Windsor 
chair was planted, was a riot of rhododendrons” (Acts 66). The passage once again 
addresses the development of human culture from its natural origins, as the “Windsor 
chair,” a cultural item that is quintessentially English, metaphorically acquires the natural 
implication of the word “planted.” However, the passage more directly creates a direct 





to watch “twelve aeroplanes in perfect formation like a flight of wild duck [come] 
overhead” (Acts 114). While the separation of land created a geological gap, the English 
Channel, the birds were able to cross the distance. The link with airplanes shows how 
humans and machines can likewise fly, and they do so by mimicking the natural world, 
“like a flight of wild duck.” No human characters make the connection, yet the 
similarities between the technological and animal forms of flight beckons a conception of 
humanity that allows for the integration of the organic and nonorganic realms, as in a 
natureculture. Discordant moments such as these, in which the play is interrupted, 
intermittently reposition humanity in terms of the greater nonhuman forces at play. 
The community is presented as a dynamic one in terms of the new technologies 
and interspecies relationships that continually reshape its existence. For example, the 
narrator describes how “the green mounds in the church-yard had been cast up by their 
molings, which for centuries had made the earth friable. True, there were absentees when 
Mr. Streatfield called his roll call in the church. The motor bike, the motor bus, and the 
movies – when Mr. Streatfield called his roll call, he laid the blame on them” (Acts 47). 
Writing at a time when these forms of transportation and cultural entertainment were 
changing private and public spaces, Woolf includes this alliterative list to suggest through 
the word “blame” that the people must adapt accordingly to these new world-shaping 
technologies. Significantly, the character’s name, Mr. Streatfield, is a compound of street 
and field, two emblematic features of cultivated and uncultivated worlds. Since his name 
causes the character to verge on caricature, the passage works to suggest that any such 
blame is misplaced and deluded when accounting for the hundreds of years humanity has 
“mol[ed]” and tilled the earth. The word “moling,” used zoomorphically, poses the 





“moling” made the soil frail and loose (“friable”). Since Mr. Streatfield is a clergyman, 
the word “friable” is also a play on the word friar, a member of a religious order. 
Positioning Mr. Streatfield’s ecclesiastical occupation as one that arises from the 
landscape further suggests that any blame on the “motor bike, the motor bus, and the 
movies” is misplaced and hypocritical. This reading is further supported by a later 
moment in which Mr. Streatfield demonstrates an interest in automobiles, saying, “I 
shouldn’t have expected either so many Hispano-Suizas… That’s a Rolls… That’s a 
Bentley… That’s the new type of Ford… To return to the meaning – Are machines the 
devil” (Acts 119). His lingering fascination with this form of transportation, highlighted 
by the ellipses, undermines his critique of machines and situates his character as a 
discredited one. 
Haraway uses the word “dance” in the phrases, “species of all kinds, living or not, 
are consequent on a subject- and object-shaping dance of encounters,” and “dance of 
world-making encounters,” to suggest that the infolding that takes place in natureculture 
is a dynamic exchange of meaning (Species 4;249). Accordingly, the novel places the 
community amidst the dynamic and changing realms of the human, animal, and 
technological worlds. The butterfly from the above passage, furthering the critter theme 
through the “tortoiseshell” descriptor as a compound of the two life forms, marks out 
time in a naturally rhythmic manner through “beat, beat, beat” (Acts 13). The three-word 
repetition emphasizes the animal’s movements as temporally ongoing and dynamic. The 
narrator attributes the same linguistic template to features in the human and technological 
realms, as well. For example, when Mrs. Sands and Mrs. Swithin are preparing a meal, 
“the cook’s hands cut, cut, cut” (Acts 23). The quote furthers the theme of rituals in the 





such as “breakfast, lunch, or dinner” (Acts 22). Indeed, three-word phrases are repeated 
throughout the novel and serve as a connection for the human and animal realms across 
which time is kept. Furthermore, these threefold repetitions recur more numerously in the 
context of machines, as the gramophone “continued,” “buzzed,” “ground,” and “ticked” 
the phrase “Chuff, chuff, chuff” (Acts 48, 49, 51). Even “the stout lady in the middle 
began to beat time with her hand on her chair” (Acts 49). The humans, machines, and 
animals, are united by rhythm. In a pause in the play’s events, the human audience 
“waited. Chuff, chuff, chuff went the machine. Could they talk? Could they move? No, 
for the play was going on. Yet the stage was empty; only the cows moved in the 
meadows; only the tick of the gramophone needle was heard. The tick, tick, tick seemed 
to hold them together, tranced” (Acts 51). Rhythm, and the marking of it, serves as a 
constant reminder of the greater human, animal, and technological forces at play in the 
novel, and ascribes dynamism to their ongoing respective actions. Furthermore, the 
perpetuation of ongoing, dynamic actions amongst the three realms serves as a temporal 
link between the novel’s events and Mrs. Swithin’s remembrance of the entities from 
prehistoric, geologic time. Because the keeping of time becomes an instance of infolding 
in which the three realms are continually redefined in terms of the other’s temporalities, 
the temporal link across times affirms the novel’s conception of a natureculture through 
the proliferation of “encounters” among “species of all kinds, living or not” (Species 4). 
The relationship between Bartholomew and his afghan hound as companion 
species is similar to Haraway’s own relationship with her dog, as they both serve as 
tokens for the mutual dependence needed for a natureculture. When the pair is 
introduced, their relationship is posed as an intimate, yet patriarchal one. The text reads, 





man bawled, as if he were commanding a regiment… Back came the Afghan hound, 
sidling, apologetic. And as he cringed at the old man’s feet, a string was slipped over his 
collar; the noose that old Oliver always carried with him” (Acts 10). Bartholomew, the 
elderly patriarch of the Oliver family, refers to his dog in a disciplinary manner. Yet, the 
word “noose” reveals a deeper emotional investment in their relationship, through both 
the suggestion of death and his emotional attachment to the hound’s leash. The leash, 
then, becomes a symbol that is in itself a means by which humanity can maintain control 
on the animal, yet acts as a life-line by which the two are sentimentally connected – even 
when the hound is not present, as implied by the phrase, “always carried with him.” 
Furthermore, their relationship is historically situated through his recounting of his 
grandfather’s own intimacy with his dog. “That,’ he indicated the man with a horse, ‘was 
my ancestor. He had a dog. The dog was famous. The dog has his place in history. He left 
it on record that he wished his dog to be buried with him” (Acts 31). This remembrance 
of his “ancestor” poses the man and dog relationship as a central feature of the 
natureculture presented in the novel through its historical infolding. This mutual 
dependence for emotional support and psychological definition shows how 
Bartholomew’s own relationship with his dog participates in a much larger tradition of 
deeply-seated intimacy with a companion species.  
At the end of the novel, Bartholomew and his dog begin to share physical 
characteristics as well, suggesting a material infolding. The narrator describes the scene: 
“Shadows fell. Shadows crept over Bartholomew’s high forehead; over his great nose. He 
looked leafless, spectral, and his chair monumental. As a dog shudders its skin, his skin 
shuddered. He rose, shook himself, glared at nothing, and stalked from the room. They 





barrier between the two species is nearly dissolved. The patriarchal figure is presented as 
a ghostly one, yet more significantly a figure decreased in size when compared to the 
monumental chair. His “great nose” as a highlighted feature is reminiscent of the moment 
when he appeared as a “monster” in using a newspaper to “cock” his nose “into a snout” 
(Acts 10). The suggestion of material infolding, now with his dog, is more directly 
confirmed when his skin resembles the “shudder[ing]” of dog’s skin. Remarkably, the 
phrase “glared at nothing” harkens to an earlier description of the Afghan hound in which 
he “gazed at [Mrs. Swithin], gazed at [Bartholomew]. He could outstare them both” (Acts 
14). While Bartholomew’s tendency for facial mimicry was emphasized earlier in the 
novel, the narrator now realigns the character’s face to directly correspond to the hound’s 
gaze through shared modes of vision. In the aforementioned passage, the antecedent of 
the “they” who heard their steps is unclear, but it could refer to the other human 
characters in the house. Or, given Woolf’s propensity to provide nonphysical forces with 
agency, “they” could refer to the “Shadows,” thereby confirming the pair’s transition into 
a more incorporeal state. They share physical traits in their mutually spectral 
transformation while their explicit material definitions are removed in becoming 
ephemerally auditory.  
In the novel, mud “makes a mess out of categories in the making of kin and kind” 
(Species 19). It functions as an amorphous source of artistic fertility that counteracts the 
patriarchal dualisms and its effects of inexpression. Miss La Trobe, at the end of the 
novel, can be read as participating in a comprehension of natureculture. In the pub, she is 
shown ruminating on her next play: 
She took her chair and looked through the smoke at a crude glass painting of a 





drank. And listened. Words of one syllable sank down into the mud. She drowsed; 
she nodded. The mud became fertile. Words rose above the intolerably laden 
dumb oxen plodding through the mud. Words without meaning – wonderful 
words. (Acts 125) 
In the passage, mud becomes an emblematic feature of natureculture, as it encapsulates 
the non-descript conglomeration needed for addressing interconnected life. The 
“fertil[ity]” of the mud, suggesting procreation, accounts for the artistic success in the 
rumination, as La Trobe then realizes “words without meaning – wonderful words” and 
“hear[s] the first words” of her next creative form of expression (Acts 125-126). In her 
subconscious state, she ponders the mud alongside paintings of “a cow,” “a cock and a 
hen,” domesticated farm animals on whom the humans in the community most closely 
depend for sustenance. The mud through which the “oxen plod,” carrying in it fragments 
of organic and nonorganic entities, and including the remembrances of Bartholomew’s 
buried ancestor, his own dog, the snake-toad zoon, and the pre-historic entities from Mrs. 
Swithin’s reconstruction, symbolizes the intertwined and intermixed life forms that 
psychologically and physically compose the beings in the community.  
The community presented in Between the Acts is Woolf’s attempt at redefining 
human life in respect to other nonhuman agents. In doing so, she depicts a worldview that 
is strikingly similar to Haraway’s conception of natureculture. Bartholomew and his 
relationship with his Afghan hound is a companion species that affirms “species 
interdependence” for shared existence (Species 19). Through this dynamic portrayal, both 
humanity and animals are redefined in an exchange of meaning. Their infolded 
relationship, similar to the snake-toad zoon and the structure of the Barn, underlies the 





juxtaposes these dualisms that stress compartmentalization and formal definition with 



























Conclusion: The Liberated Landscape 
 
“Gee, I wish we had one of them doomsday machines.” – Gen. ‘Buck’ Turgidson,  
Dr. Strangelove or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb 
 
In both To the Lighthouse and Between the Acts, Woolf is concerned with 
collapsing the dualisms that compose patriarchal structures and so dominate life. In the 
section “Time Passes,” her efforts at removing human intelligibility serve to denounce 
anthropocentrism and remove human experience from the foreground. By decentering the 
human world from its privileged focus, the presented consciousness explores multiple 
perspectives and subjectivities of previously unacknowledged and traditionally conceived 
others. Read through a cyborgian lens, the consciousness breaks down the dualisms of 
human/animal, organism/machine, and physical/nonphysical.  
This thesis describes the late twentieth-century figure of the cyborg, one that 
responds to the introduction of cybernetics and artificial intelligence into daily life, and 
applies the lens to two of Woolf’s novels. The retroactive application of the lens to a 
modernist author, whose life was not exposed to those contemporary technologies, may 
cause doubt in the very degree to which Woolf was deliberate in addressing the dualisms. 
The application of the lens, however, has great value as an inspirational and pedagogical 
tool. The cyborgian consciousness, in perceiving the nonhuman entities in “Time Passes” 
to be expressive agents, suggests how the acknowledgement of them as such is necessary 
in undermining the patriarchal dualisms and the anti-ecological practices they uphold. 
Regardless of Woolf’s direct intentions and forethought in addressing the three main 





the source by which women, nonhuman lives, and the landscape, are all positioned as 
others and exploited on those grounds. To contemporary readers, “Time Passes” 
demonstrates how a goal of cyborgian consciousness, being inclusive of all entities, 
constitutes an imaginative attempt to liberate nature from the human beliefs which mean 
to oppress it.  
In Between the Acts, Woolf disparages the same dualisms to which the figure of 
the cyborg responds, while adding focus to the collapse of the division between nature 
and culture. Her natureculture reformulates human life in an effort to end the patriarchal 
need for compartmentalization and formal definition – through which there is a 
justification for the destruction of the landscape and the nonhuman entities that inhabit it. 
Interestingly, Julia Briggs, in her introduction to Between the Acts, notes that Woolf’s 
“concurrent reading of Freud’s Moses and Monotheism may have made her even more 
aware of the pre-historic aggressions that, Freud argues, persist in present-day 
personality” (Acts xxv). Woolf’s familiarity with Freudian understandings of the 
subconscious as it relates to “pre-historic aggressions… persist[ing] in present-day 
personality” further supports her condemnatory stance against human exceptionalism, as 
displayed by Giles’ crushing of the snake-toad zoon. Moreover, the concurrent reading 
creates a further link between Woolf and Haraway, as the latter cites Freud’s work on the 
subconscious as the third “wound” to man’s “unique excellence, with dire consequences 
for teleology” (Species 11). Shared knowledge suggests how Woolf’s and Haraway’s 
respective conceptions of natureculture correspond to the same critical perspective on 
human exceptionalism. In Between the Acts, the human characters participate not only in 
a pageant play that serves to remove their privileged center as audience members, but 





existence with nonhuman entities. By presenting a natureculture, the novel attests to the 
magnanimity of life in all its forms, and maintains promise and hope for the “wonderful 
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